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Abstract
Many empirical works suggest that education has a positive effect on earnings not
only because it raises human capital but also because it functions as a signal when
employers have incomplete information on employees’ skills.
The signaling role could have important consequences on the dynamics of edu-
cation, wages, and wage distribution when there exist intergenerational linkages in
educational decisions. This paper examines the dynamic effects in an economy where
education has the dual roles and some fraction of individuals is credit constrained
from taking education. In particular, it investigates how the number of educated in-
dividuals, the importance of the signaling value of education, and the wage inequality
between educated and uneducated workers change over time in such economy, and
compares the dynamics with those when education does not function as a signal. It
also examines whether the signaling role leads to higher aggregate consumption or not
in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Education has a positive effect on earnings not only because it raises human capital but also
because it functions as a signal when employers have incomplete information on employees’
skills, i.e. they statistically discriminate workers based on education.
Many empirical works support this view. Bedard (2001) examines the idea that, in an
economy where some students are constrained from entering university, increasing the ac-
cess may raise the high school dropout rate due to the lower signaling value of high school
education (since relatively high ability students proceed to university) and finds supportive
evidence for US data. Altonji and Pierret (2001) show that, if easily observable charac-
teristics such as education and hard-to-observe correlates of workers’ skills are positively
correlated and firms statistically discriminate based on the former variables, as firms learn
about their productivities over time, coefficients on the former variables fall and those on
the latter variables rise in wage regressions, and they confirm this proposition for US data.
Positive evidence is found for other developed economies as well, such as Galindo-Rueda
(2003) for Britain and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen and Uusitalo (2008) for Finland (note, however, negative
evidence by Chevalier et al., 2004, for Britain). Evidence for developing countries is very
scarce, but Strobl (2003) finds positive evidence for Ghanian manufacturing workers who
were hired through formal channels and do not receive on-the-job-training.
In many situations, the signaling role affects education, wages, and wage distribution
statically. Further, it could have important consequences on their dynamics when there
exist intergenerational linkages in educational decisions. This paper examines the dynamic
effects in an economy where education has the dual roles and some fraction of individuals
is credit constrained from taking education. In particular, it investigates how the number
of educated individuals, the importance of the signaling value of education, and the wage
inequality between educated and uneducated workers change over time in such economy,
and compares the dynamics with those when education does not function as a signal. It
also examines whether the signaling role leads to higher aggregate consumption or not in
the long run.
The model is concerned with a small open economy populated by individuals who are
heterogeneous in terms of wealth and ability determined (exogenously) outside education,
where the ability is high (type h) or low (type l). Individuals decide whether or not to take
education that changes human capital. Since the cost of education has to be self-financed
(due to a lack of credit markets financing it), they take education only if it is affordable and
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profitable. Workers of different levels of human capital are perfectly substitutable. However,
the wage of an individual does not equal her human capital but equals a weighted average
of her skill and the average skill (wage) of those with the same educational background as
her.1 An interpretation of a positive weight on the average skill is that those who assess her
performance at work have incomplete information on her skill and thus sets a part of the
wage based on a signal, the average wage of her educational level.2 Although the information
incompleteness is the major explanation for the weight in the paper, other factors such as
effects of unions and fairness consideration in the workplace too may be important.
Because of the wage equation, the return to education of an individual can be decom-
posed into the part reflecting a change in her skill level and the part reflecting the difference
in average skills (wages) of educated and uneducated workers, which is named the signaling
value of education. Thus, she may take education whose social return is negative, if the
signaling value is high enough. Under very mild and reasonable restrictions on permissi-
ble education technologies (e.g., the return is higher for type h), it is shown that type h
individuals who can afford education always take, while decisions of corresponding type l
individuals depend on the signaling value.
The dynamic structure of the model is of an OLG variety. An individual lives for two
periods. In childhood, she receives a transfer from the parent to invest in assets and educa-
tion whose cost must be financed by the received transfer. In adulthood, she obtains income
from assets and labor supply and spends it on consumption and a transfer to her single
child, from which she derives utility (impure altruism). The intergenerational correlation of
the exogenous ability is 1, that is, descendants of a type j (j=h, l) individual continue to
be the same type, which is a strong but more realistic assumption than the other extreme
of zero correlation. Generations go by in this fashion.
The distribution of wealth (transfers) determines the proportion of individuals of each
type accessible to education, Fj,t (j = h, l). The proportions, together with exogenous
variables related to the productivity of education, the exogenous ability, and the degree of
information incompleteness (the weight on the average skill), in turn determine the return
to education and the proportion of each type taking education, and thus skill composition
1Skill and human capital are used interchangeably in this paper.
2For example, the weight may be considered as the fraction of time during which the assessors cannot
recognize her skill (and they can precisely identify it after that). This interpretation is consistent with the
finding by Altonji and Pierret (2001) cited at the beginning. The wage equation can be derived from profit
maximization problems of firms who hire workers and physical capital for production. Further, productivity
growth can be introduced into the model without affecting results qualitatively, as long as the cost of
education is assumed to grow proportionately.
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of educated and uneducated workers and their wages. Hence, by examining the dynamics of
Fj,t, the dynamics of other dimensions of the economy can be analyzed.
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Under complete information, since wage equals skill (thus the signaling value is zero
and the wage inequality is constant), the dynamics are simple: Fj,t increases (decreases)
over time if the human capital of uneducated (educated) type j workers [thus transfers to
their children] is high (low) enough relative to the cost of education, otherwise, it is time-
invariant. By contrast, the dynamics are generally complicated with incomplete information.
The analysis focuses on cases in which the dynamics of Fj,t are different qualitatively.
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Main results on the dynamics of the economy are summarized as follows. First, unlike the
complete information case, the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t are interrelated and differ greatly
depending on the initial distribution of wealth and the exogenous variables. The interaction
arises through the dependence of wages on average skills, which in turn depend on Fj,t
directly and indirectly: the number of type l individuals taking education is determined
not only by ’accessibility’, Fl,t, but also by the return to education, which depends on the
signaling value and thus both Fh,t and Fl,t.
Second, related variables too exhibit interesting dynamics under a realistic situation in
which the initial distribution of wealth is such that Fh,0 is not high and Fh,t (thus the number
of type h educated workers) increases over time at least at low Fh,t. The skill composition
of educated workers changes over time: at first, education is not profitable to the type l and
thus all educated workers are type h; after Fh,t reaches a certain level, they become indifferent
in the educational choice and the ratio of type l to type h educated workers rises over time;
after some point, all of the non-poor type l start to take but, unless Fl,t keeps growing, which
is unlikely, the ratio starts to fall eventually. As for wage-related variables, the signaling
value of education increases, uneducated wages decrease, and the wage inequality between
educated and uneducated workers rises over time when education is not profitable to the
type l; the signaling value is constant, all wages decrease, and the wage inequality falls when
they are indifferent in the choice; and after all the non-poor type l start to take education,
typically, the signaling value increases, educated (uneducated) wages increase (decrease),
and the inequality rises again. The inequality and the signaling value fall in this last stage
only if Fl,t increases and the relative growth of Fl,t to Fh,t is sufficiently high.
Finally, as for the relationship between the initial distribution of wealth and the long-run
outcome, under some conditions, both the higher proportion of educated workers as well as
3Examination of the dynamics of the wealth distribution itself is not needed to derive qualitative results.
4For example, the case in which both Fh,t and Fl,t increase over time irrespective of the initial distribution
of wealth and all workers become educated in the long run is ruled out.
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lower inequality (and signaling value) are realized with lower Fh,0 and higher Fl,0.
The number of educated workers of each type and aggregate output net of the educa-
tion cost (thus aggregate consumption) generally differ from the complete information case.
The last part of the paper investigates how they (and inequality, although results are not
presented here) differ in steady states and examines the effect of lifting the credit constraint.
When education is not socially productive to anybody, the signaling effect leads to overe-
ducation and lower net output. Type h individuals take education to mitigate the negative
effect of the presence of type l on their wage, while type l individuals take education to
benefit from the positive effect from the educated type h. Lifting the credit constraint ex-
acerbates overeducation and lowers net output further in most cases. By contrast, when
education is productive only for type h, net output is lower with the signaling effect in most
cases, because fewer type h individuals can afford education (due to the negative effect from
the uneducated type l) and/or some of the type l take unproductive education. (The effect
of the credit constraint on net output could be ambiguous.) Finally, when education is
productive for both types, net output could be higher with the signaling effect, because a
higher proportion of type l individuals can afford education due to the positive effect from
type h individuals. Clearly, lifting the credit constraint leads to optimal universal education
and maximizes net output in this case.
Several policy implications can be derived from the analyses. First, policies that enable
everyone to access education (e.g. free public education) and those that increase access
directly (e.g. wealth redistribution and tuition subsidies) or indirectly through promoting
skill accumulation outside education and thereby raising earnings of the poor (e.g. childcare
programs and job training programs for the poor) may not be desirable in the presence of the
signaling effect. Unless education is socially productive for everyone, such policies could lead
to overeducation of unproductive individuals and lower net output, whereas under complete
information, such policies always (weakly) raise net output. Hence, when the signaling effect
is not negligible, it is important to ensure that education is socially productive for everyone
(e.g. by raising the effectiveness of education especially for the disadvantaged) or to restrict
access only to high ability students (e.g. by implementing competitive entrance exams).
The harm from access-widening policies and the need for these complementary measures are
greater at later stages of development, since the signaling value of education and thus the
return to education of low ability individuals increase over time.
Second, wealth redistribution that raises the accessibility (raises both Fh,t and Fl,t since
the government usually cannot distinguish different types) may not be desirable for a dif-
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ferent reason from above: it could have a negative effect on earnings and education of the
low-ability poor. This happens if the policy stimulates education of the high-ability poor
too much, and as a result, lowers the average skill of the uneducated and thus their wages,
and hampers wealth accumulation of the low-ability poor. Such policy is certainly undesir-
able when education is socially productive. Without the signaling effect, by contrast, the
dynamics of different types are unrelated, thus the policy is always (weakly) desirable.
Finally, a positive weight on the average skill may be interpreted as effects of unions or
fairness concern in the workplace on wage setting, so the above implications apply when
these effects, not the signaling effect, are important as well.
Existing works that examine the dynamics of education, wages, and wage inequality
when education has the signaling role are very limited, among which most closely related
is Hendel, Shapiro, and Willen (2005). They use a similar model, but several important
differences exist: (i) wages equal average skills and thus are same for workers with different
abilities; (ii) education has the signaling role only; and (iii) individuals can borrow at a higher
interest rate than a lending rate to finance education. Further, they restrict the analysis to
the case in which low-ability individuals never take education and thus the skilled wage is
constant. The assumption on the credit market may be more realistic than this paper, but it
complicates the determination of temporal equilibrium (e.g., multiple temporal equilibria are
generic). Due to the simpler assumption, this paper can adopt more realistic assumptions
in other respects and examine the case in which both types take education as well. Because
both types may take education, the dynamics are much richer: for example, as mentioned
before, the proportion of the non-poor type l taking education and the wage inequality
exhibit non-monotonic dynamics typically. Further, the present paper examines relations
among exogenous variables, the initial distribution of wealth, the dynamics, and the long-
run outcome more systematically and clearly (e.g., phase diagrams are used extensively),
and investigates long-run welfare consequences of the signaling effect as well.
D’Amato and Mookherjee (2008) is another closely related work whose model differs
in: (i) the educated wage (the modern sector wage) equals the average skill, while the
uneducated wage (the traditional sector wage) is constant and does not depend on skill; (ii)
ability is a continuous variable drawn from an iid distribution and thus the intergenerational
correlation of ability is zero; (iii) assets do not exist and thus education is the only measures
to transmit wealth intergenerationally; and (iv) the cost of education decreases with ability.
The assumptions on the ability distribution and the education cost are more realistic, but,
to make the model tractable, less plausible assumptions are adopted in other respects. An
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ability threshold exists for given parental wage, and children with ability above the threshold
receive education, where the threshold is higher for poorer uneducated parents. A unique
steady state exists mainly due to no ability correlation and the constant uneducated wage.
Not many results are proved analytically (e.g., convergence to steady state is not established)
and the model allows numerous qualitatively different dynamics.
This paper is also somewhat related to the theoretical literature on statistical discrim-
ination. In particular, Antonovics (2006), building on Coate and Loury (1993), develops
a dynamic model of race-based statistical discrimination in which parents can allocate in-
comes to human capital investments of their children but firms can observe the investment
decisions only imperfectly and set wages based on two signals, race and an imprecise signal
of the investment. She examines conditions under which different racial groups that are
identical in terms of innate ability and taste may end up in steady states with different
investment and wage levels.
The modeling of the educational decision and intergenerational transmission of wealth
draws on studies on the dynamics of human capital accumulation and income distribution,
such as Galor and Zeira (1993), Ljungqvist (1993), Benabou (1996), and Yuki (2007, 2008).
Closely related are Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2007, 2008), in which the educational
decision is constrained by transfers motivated by impure altruism, as in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. For ease of presentation, in Section 2, the static part
of the model is, then, in Section 3, the full-fledged model is presented and analyzed. Results
and policy implications are presented in Section 4 and the paper is concluded in Section 5.
Proofs of lemmas and propositions are contained in a supplement available from the author
upon request.
2 Static model
This section presents and analyzes the static part of the model (all variables are presented
without time subscript). The full-fledged model is presented in the next section. Consider
a small open economy (interest rate r is exogenous) populated by individuals who are het-
erogeneous in terms of wealth and ability determined (exogenously) outside education. The
ability is high (type h) or low (type l), and the proportion of type h (type l) individuals is
H (1−H). Total (adult) population is 1.
Individuals decide whether or not to take education. Since the cost of education e has
to be self-financed, they must have enough wealth to receive education. Education changes
6
the human capital of a type j (j = h, l) individual from hju (u is for uneducated) to hje.
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Her wage reflects partly own skill and partly the average skill (wage) of those with the same
educational background as her. Specifically, the wage of a type j worker with educational
level k (k=e, u) is given by:
skE˜[hk]+(1−sk)hjk, (1)
where parameter sk ∈ [0, 12 ], (se,su) 6= (0, 0), measures the importance of the average skill,
E˜[hk], in the wage equation. An interpretation of positive sk is that the employer has in-
complete information on the worker’s ability (and acquiring more information is costly and
not profitable) and thus sets a part of the wage based on a signal, the average wage of her
educational level, where the assumption sk≤ 12 implies that the information incompleteness
is not too severe.6 Although the information incompleteness is the major explanation for
positive sk in the paper, other factors too may be important.
7 This equation can be derived
from profit maximization problems of firms who hire workers and physical capital for pro-
duction.8 Further, productivity growth can be incorporated into the model without affecting
results qualitatively, as long as the cost of education is assumed to grow proportionately.
As detailed in Section 3, an individual can also spend wealth on assets with interest rate
r. Thus, she takes education only if it is financially accessible and rewarding. Let Fj be the
fraction of type j (j=h, l) individuals with enough wealth for education, and let pje be the
probability that such individual actually takes education. Then, the wage of educated type
j workers net of the cost of education and that of uneducated type j workers are:
wje = se
pheFhHhhe+pleFl(1−H)hle
pheFhH+pleFl(1−H) +(1−se)hje−(1+r)e, (2)
5The assumption that the cost is common to the two types would be a justifiable simplifying assumption,
unless admission to school requires significant spending on private tutoring or study materials. Note that
e does not include non-material costs, which are irrelevant to the credit constraint. The type l may incur
higher disutility from study but this affects the educated wage net of the disutility, not e, and considering
the difference in the disutility would not affect qualitative results.
6For example, suppose that those who assess her performance cannot recognize her skill during the first
sk fraction of time (and they can precisely identify it after that). This interpretation is consistent with the
finding by Altonji and Pierret (2001) cited in the introduction. Alternatively, (1−sk)hjk may be construed
as the fraction of her skill (or her contribution to output) they can recognize precisely, where they do not
know that sk is common to workers with the same ethnic background, let alone the value of sk. se 6= su is
allowed because workers of different educational levels typically take different kinds of jobs and the difficulty
of knowing workers’ abilities depends on jobs’ types.
7Positive sk, particularly su, may capture effects of unions in wage setting as well. Further, when the
effect of education on human capital is strong and thus the workplace is segregated by educational levels,
positive sk may reflect fairness consideration in the workplace too.
8Suppose that firms with identical technology hire workers and physical capital to produce a final good.
Workers of different skills are perfectly substitutable in production. Then, after normalizing the wage rate
per unit of skill (which depends on total factor productivity and the interest rate) to 1, (1) is obtained.
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wju = su
[(1−phe)Fh+(1−Fh)]Hhhu+[(1−ple)Fl+(1−Fl)](1−H)hlu
[(1−phe)Fh+(1−Fh)]H+[(1−ple)Fl+(1−Fl)](1−H) +(1−su)hju. (3)
That is, E˜[he] (E˜[hu]) and thus wje (wju) increase (decrease) with Fh and phe and decrease
(increase) with Fl and ple (note that hhu>hlu and hhe>hle).
The gross return to education for a type j individual is seE˜[he]+(1−se)hje−{suE˜[hu]+(1−
su)hju}, out of which seE˜[he]−suE˜[hu] is the return unrelated to her skill accumulation and
thus named the signaling value of education. Two assumptions are imposed on the return.
Assumption 1 (Return to education of type h individuals)
hhe−(1+r)e > su[Hhhu+(1−H)hlu]+(1−su)hhu.
It states that a type h individual has a minimal incentive to take education: she wants to
take it if nobody does and she can receive the highest possible wage with education.9
Assumption 2 (Difference between returns to education of two types)
[(1−se)hhe−(1−su)hhu]−[(1−se)hle−(1−su)hlu] = (1−se)(hhe−hle)−(1−su)(hhu−hlu) > 0.
This states that the return is strictly greater for the high ability type. That is, education
enlarges the inter-type wage differential. These assumptions impose mild restrictions on
permissible education technologies (associations between hju and hje, j=h, l).
2.1 Educational choice
2.1.1 Type h individuals
Lemma 1 (Educational choices of type h individuals) phe = 1.
That is, type h individuals, if financially accessible, always take education.
2.1.2 Type l individuals
Decisions of type l individuals are more complex. When (Fh,Fl) 6=(1,1) or su=0, ple=1 iff
se
FhHhhe+Fl(1−H)hle
FhH+Fl(1−H) +(1−se)hle−(1+r)e≥su
(1−Fh)Hhhu+(1−Fl)(1−H)hlu
(1−Fh)H+(1−Fl)(1−H) +(1−su)hlu, (4)
that is, iff the net return to education (net of (1+r)e) for type l is non-negative with ple=1.
To derive the corresponding condition when Fh = Fl = 1 and su > 0, firms’ beliefs on
expected skill of a worker taking an action not observed under ple=1, i.e. not take education,
9The weakest condition for phe > 0 to be an equilibrium is hhe− (1+ r)e > suhlu+(1−su)hhu. When
this condition but not Assumption 1 holds, phe = ple = 0 is always an equilibrium, while whether phe > 0
is an equilibrium or not depends on Fh (thus multiple equilibria are possible). Since phe = ple = 0 is not
an interesting equilibrium from the paper’s perspective, a stronger assumption is imposed to simplify the
analysis. The essentially same assumption is made in Hendel, Shapiro and Willen (2005) (equation 4).
8
must be specified. Under the reasonable belief formation explained in the proof of Lemma
1, it can be shown that ple=1 iff
10
se[Hhhe+(1−H)hle]+(1−se)hle−(1+r)e ≥ hlu. (5)
When (Fh,Fl) 6= (1, 1) or su=0, if (4) does not hold, not all of the non-poor type l take
education. Some of them do take, i.e. ple∈(0, 1), iff
sehhe+(1−se)hle−(1+r)e > su (1−Fh)Hhhu+(1−H)hlu
(1−Fh)H+(1−H) +(1−su)hlu, (6)
that is, the net return is positive with ple=0, and ple=0 otherwise. When ple∈ (0, 1), they
are indifferent in the choice and thus ple is determined by
se
FhHhhe+pleFl(1−H)hle
FhH+pleFl(1−H) +(1−se)hle−(1+r)e=su
(1−Fh)Hhhu+[(1−ple)Fl+(1−Fl)](1−H)hlu
(1−Fh)H+[(1−ple)Fl+(1−Fl)](1−H) +(1−su)hlu. (7)
When ple=1 (=0), the LHS of (7) is strictly less (greater) than the RHS, because (4) with
’≥’ replaced by ’<’ and (6) hold. Further, when se>0 (su>0), the LHS decreases (the RHS
increases) with ple, hence there exists a unique ple∈(0, 1) satisfying the equation. As is clear
from the equation, ple increases with Fh and decreases with Fl.
When Fh=Fl=1 and su>0, if (5) is not satisfied, ple∈(0, 1) iff
sehhe+(1−se)hle−(1+r)e > hlu, (8)
which is (6) with Fh=1, and ple =
(se(hhe−hle)−{hlu−[hle−(1+r)e]})H
{hlu−[hle−(1+r)e]}(1−H) .
It is useful to introduce a figure showing educational choices of the type l for each
combination of Fh and Fl (> 0). The next lemma describes the shape of the dividing line
between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1) (equation 4 with ’≥’ replaced by ’=’) on the (Fh,Fl) plane.
Lemma 2 (Shape of the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1)) The dividing line
between ple=1 and ple∈ (0, 1) is continuous and positively sloped on the (Fh,Fl) plane. Fur-
ther, it is strictly convex (strictly concave) when Fl < (>)Fh.
Together with Lemma 2, the next lemma describes precisely educational choices of type
l individuals when (Fh,Fl) 6=(1, 1). For notational simplicity, define E[hk, φ]≡φhhk+(1−φ)hlk
(k= e, u), where φ∈ [0, 1]. For example, E[he, seH] is a weighted average of human capital
of the educated when the weight on hhe is seH.
Lemma 3 (Educational choices of the type l at (Fh,Fl) 6=(1,1))When (Fh,Fl) 6=(1,1),
(I) If E[he, se]≡sehhe+(1−se)hle≤(1+r)e+hlu (< when se=0), ple=0 for any Fh,Fl.
(II) If hle≥(1+r)e+suhhu+(1−su)hlu=(1+r)e+E[hu, su], ple=1 for any Fh,Fl.
(III) Otherwise,
10When se=0 and hle−(1+r)e=hlu, ple=1, not ple∈ [0, 1], is assumed.
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(a) if E[he, seH] < (1+r)e+E[hu, suH], the dividing line between ple= 1 and ple ∈ (0,1) is
located below Fl=Fh on the (Fh,Fl) plane and ple<1 when Fl≥Fh.
(i) If E[he, se]< (1+r)e+E[hu, suH], it crosses Fl=0 at Fh∈(0,1), and ple=0 for Fh lower
than the value at the intersection. Otherwise, it approaches (Fh,Fl)=(0,0).
(ii) If E[he,seH]<(≥)(1+r)e+hlu, it crosses Fh=1 at Fl∈(0,1) (approaches (Fh,Fl)=(1,1)).
(b) if E[he,seH]=(1+r)e+E[hu,suH], ple=1 (∈(0,1)) when Fl≤(>)Fh.
(c) if E[he,seH]>(1+r)e+E[hu,suH], it is located above Fl=Fh and ple=1 when Fl≤Fh.
(i) If E[he,seH]<(≥)(1+r)e+E[hu,su], it approaches(Fh,Fl)=(1,1)(crosses Fl=1 at Fh∈(0,1)).
(ii) If hle<(≥) (1+r)e+E[hu,suH], it approaches (Fh,Fl)=(0,0) (crosses Fh=0 at Fl∈(0,1)).
The next lemma summarizes educational choices at (Fh,Fl)=(1, 1) described earlier.
Lemma 4 (Educational choices of the type l at (Fh,Fl)=(1,1)) At (Fh,Fl)=(1, 1),
(i) ple=0 iff sehhe+(1−se)hle ≤ (1+r)e+hlu (< when se=0).
(ii) ple=(<)1 iff seHhhe+(1−seH)hle ≥(<)(1+r)e+hlu.
Lemmas 3 (I) and 4 (i) show that ple=0 for any Fh and Fl, if education is not profitable
for type l even when the average skill of the educated is highest and that of the uneducated
is lowest. Similarly, from Lemmas 3 (II) and 4 (ii), ple=1 always, if education is profitable
for them even when the average skill of the educated is lowest and that of the uneducated
is highest.11 Otherwise, ple depends on Fh and Fl, thus it is convenient to introduce figures
illustrating their choices.
Figure 1 illustrates the choices when E[he, seH] < (1+ r)e+E[hu, suH] and E[he, se] >
(1+r)e+hlu, based on Lemmas 2, 3 (III)(a), and 4.
12 In this case, the dividing line between
ple = 1 and ple ∈ (0,1) is located below Fl=Fh. For given Fh, when Fl is greater than the
value on the dividing line and thus ple ∈ (0,1), the proportion of the educated among the
type l equals Fl on the dividing line.
In general, ple=1 tends to hold when Fh is high and Fl is low: as the proportion of the
type h (type l) accessible to education is higher (lower), the average skill of the educated
(uneducated) is higher (lower), the signaling value of education is higher, and the net return
to education is more likely to be positive. If E[he,se]<(1+r)e+E[hu,suH] (Figure 1 (iii) and
(iv)), ple=0 when Fh is very low: since education is not very effective in raising skill (given
hhu and hlu, hhe and hle are low) and the average skill of the uneducated is not low (due to
11At (Fh,Fl)= (1,1), all the type h take education, so the lowest possible average skill of the educated is
Hhhe+(1−H)hle.
12From Lemma 3, when se=0 (su=0), only Figure 1 (iii)[(ii)] is possible.
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(i) E[he,se]≥(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
and E[he,seH]≥(1+r)e+hlu
(ii) E[he,se]≥(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
and E[he,seH]<(1+r)e+hlu
(iii) E[he,se]<(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
and E[he,seH]≥(1+r)e+hlu
(iv) E[he,se]<(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
and E[he,seH]<(1+r)e+hlu
Figure 1: Educational choices of type l individuals when E[he,seH]< (1+r)e+E[hu,suH] and
E[he,se]>(1+r)e+hlu(≥ if se=0) (Lemma 3 (III)(a))
high 1−Fh), the net return is negative for type l. When E[he,seH]≥ (1+r)e+hlu (Figure 1
(i) and (iii)), ple=1 at (Fh,Fl)=(1,1) from Lemma 4.
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Similarly, Figure 2 presents the choices when E[he,seH]> (1+r)e+E[hu,suH] and hle <
(1+r)e+E[hu,su], based on Lemmas 2, 3 (III)(c), and 4.
14 The dividing line is above Fl=Fh,
i.e. ple = 1 for Fl < Fh, due to the higher net return than in the previous case. When
E[he,seH]<(1+r)e+E[hu,su] (Figure 2 (iii) and (iv)), ple=1 at (Fh,Fl)=(1,1) from Lemma 4.
13From (5), she strictly prefers taking education, unless E[he,seH] = (1+ r)e+hlu. In contrast, when
(Fh,Fl) 6=(1, 1), ple=1 on the dividing line but the type l are indifferent in the educational choice from (4).
14From Lemma 3, when se=0 (su=0), only Figure 2 (iii)[(ii)] is possible.
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(i) E[he,seH]≥(1+r)e+E[hu,su]
and hle≥(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
(ii) E[he,seH]≥(1+r)e+E[hu,su]
and hle<(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
(iii) E[he,seH]<(1+r)e+E[hu,su]
and hle≥(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
(iv) E[he,seH]<(1+r)e+E[hu,su]
and hle<(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]
Figure 2: Educational choices of type l individuals when E[he,seH]> (1+r)e+E[hu,suH] and
hle<(1+r)e+E[hu,su] (Lemma 3 (III)(c))
2.2 Wages
Equilibrium wages (net of the cost of education for educated workers) are derived by plugging
values of phe(=1) and ple into (2) and (3). Lemma 5 shows how they depend on Fh and Fl.
Lemma 5 (Relationship between wages and Fh, Fl)
(i) When ple=1 and su>0 (se>0), wju (wje) (j=h, l) decreases (increases) with Fh and
increases (decreases) with Fl.
(ii) When ple ∈ (0,1) and su,se > 0, wages decrease with Fh for Fl ≤ Fh; for Fl > Fh, they
decrease (increase) with Fh if E[he,seH]<(>)(1+r)e+E[hu,suH]; and they do not depend
on Fl. When su=0 or se=0, they are constant.
(iii) When ple=0, wju (j=h, l) decreases with Fh if su>0, while whe=hhe−(1+r)e.
When ple = 1 and su > 0 (se > 0), higher Fh and lower Fl are associated with the lower
(higher) average skill of the uneducated (educated) and thus lower wju (higher wje) (j=h,l).
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When ple=0, only type h individuals take education, thus uneducated wages depend only on
Fh (when su>0) and whe is same as under su=se=0. By contrast, when ple∈ (0,1), Fh and
Fl affect the average skills not only directly but also indirectly through ple so that wle=wlu
is maintained, and the indirect effect operates opposite in direction: higher Fh and lower Fl
lead to higher ple and thus the higher (lower) average skill of the uneducated (educated).
When su=0 or se=0, the opposing effects offset each other and the wages are independent of
Fh and Fl. The same is true for Fl when su,se>0. As for Fh when su,se>0, the direct effect
is stronger (weaker) than the indirect one for wju (wje) and the wages decrease with Fh for
Fl≤Fh, while the same (opposite) is true for Fl>Fh when E[he, seH]<(>)(1+r)e+E[hu, suH],
which corresponds to the case of Figure 1 (Figure 2).
3 Dynamic model
Based on the results in the previous section, this section presents and analyzes the dynamic
model. Consider a small open OLG economy populated by a continuum of individuals who
are heterogeneous in terms of wealth and ability determined (exogenously) outside education.
An individual lives for two periods, first as a child and then as an adult.
3.1 Lifetime of an individual
Childhood: In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent and spends it
on two investment options, assets (which yields interest rate r) and education (which costs
e), in order to maximize future income. Consider an individual born into lineage i in period
t−1 (generation t) who receives bit units of transfer and can allocate it between asset ait
and education eit. As shown in the previous section, phe,t=1, while ple,t can take any value
between 0 and 1 depending on Fh,t, Fl,t, and exogenous variables and parameters. When
her type is j (j=h, l) and pje,t=1, the allocation is determined by b
i
t:
ait=b
i
t, e
i
t=0, if b
i
t<e, (9)
ait=b
i
t−e, eit=e, if bit≥e. (10)
By contrast, a type l individual is indifferent in the choice when ple,t ∈ (0, 1) and bit ≥ et,
while ait=b
i
t and e
i
t=0 otherwise.
Adulthood: In adulthood, she obtains income from assets and labor supply and spends
it on consumption cit and a transfer to her single child, b
i
t+1. She maximizes the utility
uit =
(
cit
)1−γb(bit+1)γb , 0<γb<1. (11)
subject to the budget constraint
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cit+b
i
t+1 = w
i
t+(1+r)a
i
t, (12)
where wit is her gross wage. By solving the maximization problem, the following consumption
and transfer rules are obtained.
cit = (1−γb){wit+(1+r)ait}, (13)
bit+1 = γb{wit+(1+r)ait}. (14)
Generational change: At the beginning of period t+1, current adults pass away, current
children become adults, and new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has
one child, the population of each generation is time-invariant and normalized to be one.
3.2 Dynamics of individual transfers
The dynamic equation linking the received transfer bit to the transfer given to the next
generation b it+1 is derived from (14). For a current uneducated worker of type j (j= l, h), it
is obtained by substituting wit=wju,t and a
i
t=b
i
t into (14):
b it+1 = γb{wju,t+(1+r)bit}. (15)
The assumption γb(1+r)<1 is made so that the fixed point of the equation for given wju,t,
b∗(wju,t) ≡ γb1−γb(1+r)wju,t, exists. The fixed point becomes crucial in later analyses. For a
present educated worker of type j (j= l, h), the dynamic equation is
b it+1 = γb{wje,t+(1+r)bit}, (16)
which is obtained by substituting wit=wje,t+(1+r)e (wje,t is the net wage) and a
i
t=b
i
t−e into
(14). When ple,t∈(0, 1), wle,t=wlu,t holds, so the two equations coincide for type l.
The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on the time
evolution of wage and education levels and thus (from Sections 2.1 and 2.2) the evolution of
Fh,t, Fl,t, and ability determined outside education. It is assumed that the intergenerational
correlation of the ability is 1, that is, descendants of a type j individual continue to be type
j. Although this assumption is strong, considering that the ability reflects not only innate
ability, which itself shows a high correlation, but also abilities developed through interactions
with parents, it would be more realistic than the other extreme of zero correlation.
3.3 Aggregate dynamics
The time evolution of Fh,t and Fl,t, the fractions of type h and l individuals who can afford
education, is in turn determined by the dynamics of individual transfers. That is, the
individual and aggregate dynamics are interrelated.
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Specifically, when pju = 1 (j = l, h), if offspring of some of type j uneducated workers
become accessible to education through wealth accumulation, Frj ,t+1 >Frj ,t , while, if some of
educated workers cannot leave enough transfers to cover the cost of education, Frj ,t+1 <Frj ,t .
The former occurs iff there exist lineages satisfying bit < e and b
i
t+1 ≥ e. From (15), the
following condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b∗(wju,t) ≡ γb
1−γb(1+r)
wju,t > e. (17)
By contrast, the latter occurs iff lineages satisfying bit≥e and bit+1<e exist. From (16), the
necessary condition is
b∗(wje,t) ≡ γb
1−γb(1+r)
wje,t < e. (18)
Since b∗(wje,t)≥ b∗(wju,t), the above equations cannot hold simultaneously. If (17) holds,
Frj ,t+1 ≥ Frj ,t , while if (18) is true, Frj ,t+1 ≤ Frj ,t ; Frj ,t+1 = Frj ,t is possible depending on
the distribution of transfers over the population, but, if the condition continues to hold,
Frj ,t does change at some point. When neither equations are satisfied, Frj ,t+1 =Frj ,t . The
dynamics of Frl ,t when ple,t∈ (0, 1) are determined by the relative value of b∗(wlu,t)=b∗(wle,t)
to e and the dynamics when ple,t=0 depend on the relative value of b
∗(wlu,t) to e only.
By substituting (3) with phe=ple=1 into (17) (with ’>’ replaced by ’R’), and substituting
(2) with phe = ple = 1 into (18) (with ’<’ replaced by ’R’) and rearranging, the critical
equations when ple=1 are given by (time subscripts are suppressed):
b∗(whu)R e ⇔ su (1−Fh)Hhhu+(1−Fl)(1−H)hlu(1−Fh)H+(1−Fl)(1−H) +(1−su)hhu R
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, (19)
⇔ Fl R 1−
[
hhu− 1−γb(1+r)γb e
]
H(1−Fh){1−γb(1+r)
γb
e−E[hu,1−su]
}
(1−H)
, if E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e, (20)
b∗(wlu)R e ⇔ su (1−Fh)Hhhu+(1−Fl)(1−H)hlu(1−Fh)H+(1−Fl)(1−H) +(1−su)hlu R
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, (21)
⇔ Fl R 1−
{
E[hu,su]− 1−γb(1+r)γb e
}
H[1−γb(1+r)
γb
e−hlu
]
(1−H)
(1−Fh), if hlu < 1−γb(1+r)γb e, (22)
b∗(whe)R e ⇔ seFhHhhe+Fl(1−H)hleFhH+Fl(1−H) +(1−se)hheR
e
γb
, (23)
⇔ Fl Q
hhe− eγb
e
γb
−E[he,1−se]
H
1−H Fh, if E[he,1−se] <
e
γb
, (24)
b∗(wle) R e ⇔ seFhHhhe+Fl(1−H)hleFhH+Fl(1−H) +(1−se)hle R
e
γb
, (25)
⇔ Fl Q
E[he,se]− eγb
e
γb
−hle
H
1−H Fh, if hle <
e
γb
. (26)
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When ple=0, by substituting Fl=0 into (19),
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b∗(whu) R e ⇔ su (1−Fh)Hhhu+(1−H)hlu(1−Fh)H+(1−H) +(1−su)hhuR
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, (27)
⇔ Fh Q 1−
{ 1−γb(1+r)
γb
e−E[hu,1−su]
}
(1−H)[
hhu− 1−γb(1+r)γb e
]
H
. (28)
Regarding values of hhe and hlu relative to e, the following assumption is imposed.
Assumption 3 (Dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t when se=su=0)
(i) whe,max≡hhe− (1+r)e ≥ 1−γb(1+r)γb e.
(ii) wlu,min≡hlu ≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e.
If (i) [(ii)] is not satisfied, Fh,t and Fl,t decrease [increase] over time and Fh=Fl=0 [= 1 ]
in the long run, as when se= su=0. The assumption is imposed to rule out these obvious
situations. From the equations, under complete information, Fh,t non-decreases and Fl,t
non-increases over time, and, in the long run, Fh = 1 (when hhu >
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e) or Fh = Fh,0
(otherwise), and Fl=0 (when hle<
e
γb
) or Fl=Fl,0 (otherwise).
The next lemma presents conditions for existence of b∗(wjk)= e (j=h,l; k= e,u) and its
position on the (Fh,Fl) plane. (If it does not exist, b
∗(wjk)>e or<e for any Fh and Fl.)
Lemma 6 (Positions of b∗(wjk)=e (j=h,l; k=e,u))
(i) b∗(whu)=e when ple=1 exists only if hhu>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e>E[hu,1−su]. When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]<
(>)1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, it intersects with Fh=0 at Fl∈(0,1) (Fl=0 at Fh∈(0,1)).
(ii) b∗(wlu)=e exists only if E[hu, su]>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e. When E[hu,suH]<(>)
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, it intersects
with Fh=0 at Fl∈(0,1) (Fl=0 at Fh∈(0,1)).
(iii) b∗(whe)=e exists only if E[he, 1−se]< eγb . When E[he,1−se(1−H)]<(>)
e
γb
, it intersects
with Fh=1 at Fl∈(0,1) (Fl=1 at Fh∈(0,1)).
(iv) b∗(wle)= e exists only if E[he,se]>
e
γb
>hle. When E[he,seH]< (>)
e
γb
, it intersects with
Fh=1 at Fl∈(0,1) (Fl=1 at Fh∈(0,1)).
(v) b∗(whu)=e when ple=0 exists at Fh∈(0,1) only if E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>E[hu,1−su].
Figure 3 illustrates Lemma 6 (i)-(iv) graphically on the (Fh,Fl) plane. As for b
∗(wju)= e
(j=h, l) [Figure 3 (i) and (ii)], b∗(wju)>(<)e above (below) the locus, since wju when ple=1
increases with Fl and decreases with Fh. As hhu and hlu become greater relative to e, the
locus shifts downward and the region satisfying b∗(wju)>e expands. As for b
∗(wje)=e [Figure
3 (iii) and (iv)], b∗(wje)> (<)e below (above) the locus, and, as hhe and hle become greater
relative to e, the locus shifts upward and the region satisfying b∗(wje)>e expands.
15b∗(wlu)Re when ple=0 is not presented because it is not used in later analyses. From Assumption 3 (i)
just below, b∗(whe)>e when ple=0.
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(i) b∗(whu)=e when ple=1
(exists when hhu>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e>E[hu,1−su])
(ii) b∗(wlu)=e
(exists when E[hu,su]>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e)
(iii) b∗(whe)=e
(exists when E[he,1−se]< eγb )
(iv) b∗(wle)=e
(exists when E[he,se]>
e
γb
>hle)
Figure 3: Positions of b∗(wjk)=e (j=h,l; k=e,u) (Lemma 6)
Figure 3 has presented positions of the critical loci under the supposition that ple=1 for
any Fh and Fl, which is generally not true, as proved in Lemmas 3 and 4 and as illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2. b∗(wjk) = e (j = h,l; k = e,u) when ple = 1 (= 0) is effective only in the
region ple=1 (= 0) on the (Fh,Fl) plane, i.e. in the region below the dividing line between
ple=1 and ple∈(0, 1) (at the left side of the dividing line between ple=0 and ple>0). Thus,
the relationship between b∗(wjk)=e and the dividing lines must be known.
Lemmas A1, A2, and A3 of Appendix summarize the relation of the dividing line between
ple=1 and ple∈(0,1) with b∗(whe)=e, b∗(whu)=e, and b∗(wlk)=e (k=e,u), respectively. Lemmas
A1 and A2 are illustrated in Figures A1 and A2 as well. The lemmas are used in proving
main results presented in the next section, including the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t.
17
Figure 4: Regions of Propositions 1A, 1B, and 1C on the (hhu,hlu) plane
4 Results
4.1 Dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t and of related variables
This subsection analyzes the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t and of related variables such as
wages, wage inequality, and the signaling value of education. It also examines how the
initial distribution of wealth affects steady-state values of the variables. The dynamics are
qualitatively different depending on exogenous variables and parameters. Hence, for ease of
presentation, the results are presented in three propositions. Roughly speaking, Propositions
1A, 1B, and 1C below correspond to cases in which hhu and hlu are low (especially hhu),
intermediate, and high (especially hlu), respectively (see Figure 4).
16 In terms of the cost of
education, they correspond to cases in which e is high, intermediate, and low, respectively.
In the figure and in the propositions, F∗j (j = h, l) denotes a steady-state value of Fj. As
mentioned earlier, if hlu>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e (not considered below), F∗h=F
∗
l =1. In some cases, the
results are presented only for Fl,t≤Fh,t, since it is reasonable to assume Fl,0≤Fh,0 and, in
these cases, Fl,t≤Fh,t is satisfied for any t when Fl,0≤Fh,0.
Proposition 1A presents the dynamics when E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e. b
∗(whu)=e is the one
when ple=1 except in (II)(a), in which it could be the one when ple=0 as well.
Proposition 1A (Dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t,part A) Suppose E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e.
(I) When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(a) If E[he,se]≤ eγb (<with se=0), Fl,t decreases over time and F
∗
l =0.
16Since se,su∈ [0, 12 ], the weight on hhu (hlu) is greater than hlu (hhu) in the equation dividing Propositions
1A and 1B (1B and 1C).
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(i) If E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb and (1−se)(hhe−hle)+hlu<
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, Fh,t decreases (is constant)
above (on or below) effective b∗(whe)=e.
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(ii)Otherwise, Fh,t is constant for Fl,t≤Fh,t and F∗h=Fh,0.
(b) If E[he,se]>
e
γb
(≥with se=0), Fh,t is constant for Fl,t≤Fh,t and F∗h=Fh,0.
(i) If E[he,seH]<
e
γb
, Fl,t decreases above b
∗(wle)=e and is constant otherwise.
(ii)Otherwise, Fl,t too is constant for Fl,t≤Fh,t and F∗l =Fl,0.
(II) When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(a)When E[he,se]≤ eγb (< with se=0), Fl,t decreases and F
∗
l =0. Fh,t increases above (or
at the left side of) effective b∗(whu) = e, decreases above effective b
∗(whe) = e, and is
constant otherwise.18
(b)When E[he,se]>
e
γb
(≥with se=0)
(i) If E[he,seH]<
e
γb
, b∗(wle)=e and b
∗(whu)=e intersect below the 45
◦ line (and below the
dividing line between ple = 1 and ple ∈ (0,1), if it exists). Fl,t decreases (is constant)
above (on or below) b∗(wle)=e and Fh,t increases (is constant) at the left (right) side of
effective b∗(whu)=e.
19
(ii)Otherwise, Fl,t is constant for Fl,t≤Fh,t and F∗l =Fl,0, and Fh,t increases (is constant)
at the left (right) side of b∗(whu)=e.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics when E[hu,1−su(1−H)]≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (Proposition 1A(I)),
that is, when hhu and hlu (especially hhu) are very low, or e is very high (see Figure 4).
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Horizontal (vertical) arrows represent directions of motion of Fh,t (Fl,t), while, in regions
with slanted lines, both Fh,t and Fl,t are time-invariant. As explained in footnote 20, it is
possible that the position of the dividing line and the line’s relation with b∗(whe) = e are
different from those in the figure, but qualitative results are mostly unchanged.
The figure shows that Fh,t never increases at Fl,t ≤ Fh,t. This is so even when hhu >
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e (and su> 0), in which Fh,t increases over time under su= se=0. Since hhu and/or
hlu are very low (or e is very high), the presence of type l uneducated workers depresses whu,t
below 1−γb(1+r)
γb
e and descendants of the type h uneducated cannot accumulate enough wealth
17b∗(whe)=e is below the 45◦ line. If (1−se)(hhe−hle)+E[hu, suH]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e, it intersects with the dividing
line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1), and Fh,t is constant when it is smaller than the value at the intersection.
18See the proof of the proposition for possible relations among the loci.
19The dividing line exists when hle< (1+r)e+E[hu, su]. b∗(whu)= e intersects with the line if E[he,seH]+
(1−su)(hhu−hlu)< eγb , and Fh,t is time-invariant when it is greater than the value at the intersection.
20(a)(i) and (b)(i) of the proposition (Figure 5 (a)(i) and (b)(i)) apply only when se > 0. In (a)(i), the
dividing line may intersect with b∗(whe) = e (see footnote 17) or ple =1 at least for any Fl ≤Fh may hold;
in (a)(ii), ple=0 for any Fl and Fh, ple=0 for small Fh, and ple=1 for Fl≤Fh are possible; and in (b)(i),
ple=1 at least for Fl≤Fh may hold.
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(a)(i) (E[he,se]<)E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb
and (1−se)(hhe−hle)+hlu< 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(a)(ii) E[he,se]≤ eγb (<when se=0) and
the other conditions of (a)(i) are not satisfied
(b)(i) E[he,se]>
e
γb
>E[he,seH] (b)(ii) E[he,seH]≥ eγb
Figure 5: Examples of the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t when E[hu,1−su(1−H)]≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(Proposition 1A (I))
for education. Further, when hhe is particularly low (Figure 5 (a)(i)),
21 Fh,t decreases over
time above b∗(whe)=e (where b
∗(whe,t)<e holds) due to the low average skill of the educated.
As for the dynamics of Fl,t, when E[he, se] ≤ eγb (< if se = 0), that is, when hhe and
(particularly) hle are low (see Figure 6),
22 Fl,t decreases over time and F
∗
l =0 (Figure 5 (a)(i)
and (a)(ii)). Even with Fh,0>>0, it is possible that nobody can afford education in the long
21Since (1−se)(hhe−hle)+hlu< 1−γb(1+r)γb e⇔ hle>hhe−
1
1−se [
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e−hlu], hle is not particularly low in (a)(i).
22In Figure 6, feasible (hhe,hle) must be at the right side of hhe = (1+ r)e+E[hu, 1− su(1−H)] from
Assumption 1 and must be below (1−se)(hhe−hle)=(1−su)(hhu−hlu) from Assumption 2. The relative position
of (1−se)(hhe−hle)=(1−su)(hhu−hlu) to (hhe,hle)=( eγb ,
e
γb
) is always as in the figure, and, as hhu−hlu increases,
it shifts downward. The corresponding figure for Proposition 1A(I) is slightly different from Figure 6 in that
(1+r)e+E[hu, 1−su(1−H)]≤ eγb .
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Figure 6: Regions of (a), (b)(i), and (b)(ii) of Propositions 1A(II), 1B, and 1C
on the (hhe,hle) plane
run, i.e. F∗h=F
∗
l =0 (Figure 5 (a)(i)). By contrast, when education is more effective, i.e. hhe
and/or hle are higher (Figure 5 (b)(i) and (b)(ii)), F
∗
l >0 from most initial conditions because
of the positive effect of type h educated workers on wle. This is so even when hle <
e
γb
, in
which F∗l =0 with su= se=0. When the productivity of education is high, both Fh,t and Fl,t
are time-invariant for any Fl,t≤Fh,t (Figure 5 (b)(ii)).
Wage dynamics can be analyzed based on the proposition and Lemma 5. In Figure 5
(a)(ii) and (b)(i) and in the region on or below b∗(whe) = e of Figure 5 (a)(i), since Fh,t is
constant and Fl,t falls over time, when ple,t = 1, wages of educated (uneducated) workers
increase (decrease) and the inter-group wage inequality rises over time.23
The signaling value of education, seE˜[he]−suE˜[hu], increases with Fh,t and decreases with
Fl,t when ple,t=1, is constant (equals (1−su)hlu−(1−se)hle+(1+r)e) when ple,t ∈ (0, 1), and
increases with Fh,t when ple,t=0. Thus, it rises over time when ple,t=1, unless Fh,t falls.
Finally, the relationship between the initial distribution of wealth and steady-state values
of the variables is discussed. Except in (a)(i), F∗j (j = h, l) and the proportion of educated
workers are higher when Fh,0 and Fl,0 (in (b)(i) and (b)(ii)) are higher. In (a)(i), by contrast,
if Fl,0 is high enough that b
∗(whe,0)<e, the proportion decreases with Fl,0. Educated wages
are lower (in (b)(i) and (b)(ii)), uneducated wages are higher, and the wage differential and
the signaling value are lower in the long run, when Fh,0 is lower and Fl,0 is higher, that is,
when initial wealth is distributed relatively equally over the two types.
Similarly, Figure 7 shows the dynamics when E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>E[hu,1−su],
23When ple,t < 1, from Lemma 5 (ii) and (iii), wages are constant. As for the region above b∗(whe) = e
of Figure 5 (a)(i), since both Fh,t and Fl,t decrease over time, directions of motion of wages are ambiguous
when ple,t=1, whereas they increase over time when ple,t∈(0, 1).
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(a) E[he,se]≤ eγb (< when se=0) (b)(i) E[he,se]>
e
γb
>E[he,seH]
(b)(ii) E[he,seH]≥ eγb
Figure 7: Examples of the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t
when E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>E[hu,1−su] (Proposition 1A (II))
which is possible only when su> 0 (Proposition 1A (II)).
24 Compared to the previous case,
(b)(i) and (b)(ii) rather than (a) are more likely because higher hju (j=h, l) leads to higher
hje under realistic education technologies. With higher hhu and/or hlu (or lower e), Fh,t
now increases over time when it is not large and thus the average skill of the uneducated
is not low, while the dynamics of Fl,t are qualitatively same as before. In regions where
Fh,t increases, educated (uneducated) wages increase (decrease) and the wage differential
(and the signaling value) rises over time when ple,t=1, whereas when ple,t∈ (0,1), all wages
24Unlike Figure 5, ineffective portions of the critical loci are not presented. Figure 7 (b)(i) applies only
when se > 0. In (a), ple =0 for any Fl and Fh (then, b∗(whe)> e and b∗(whu) = e when ple =0 is effective),
ple > 0 always, and ple =1 at least for Fl ≤Fh (then, b∗(whe)> e) are possible. A portion of b∗(whu) = e is
always effective, while b∗(whe)=e may be ineffective. In (b)(i), ple=1 at least for Fl≤Fh may hold.
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decrease (from Lemma 5) and the average wage inequality between educated and uneducated
workers falls.25 The relationship between the initial distribution and the long-run outcome
in (b)(i) and (b)(ii) is qualitatively same as the corresponding cases of Proposition 1A(I),
while, in (a), for high [low] Fh,0, it is qualitatively same as [similar to] (a)(i) [(a)(ii)] of 1A(I).
The dynamics when E[hu,1−su]≥ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (> with su = 0) and E[hu,suH]≤
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e is
presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 1B (Dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t,part B) If E[hu,1− su] ≥ (> with su = 0)
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e≥E[hu,suH], Fh,t grows over time and F∗h=1.
(a) When E[he,se]≤ eγb (< with se=0), Fl,t decreases over time and F
∗
l =0.
(b) When E[he,se]>
e
γb
(≥ with se=0)
(i) If E[he,seH]<
e
γb
, Fl,t decreases (is constant) above (on or below) b
∗(wle)=e.
(ii) Otherwise, Fl,t is time-invariant for Fl,t≤Fh,t and F∗l =Fl,0.
Figure 8 illustrates the proposition graphically.26 The major difference from the previous
cases is that Fh,t increases over time and F
∗
h=1, as when su= se=0 (note hhu>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e in
this case). With even higher hhu and/or hlu (or lower e), descendants of type h uneducated
workers manage to accumulate enough wealth for education despite the negative effect of
the presence of the type l uneducated (on whu,t). The dynamics of Fl,t are qualitatively same
as before and depend on hhe, hle, and e. Thus, when the efficiency of education, particularly
for type l, is very low (Figure 8 (a)), Fh,t increases and Fl,t decreases over time, and the
two types are completely segregated by educational levels in the long run, i.e. F∗h=1 and
F∗l = 0, as under su = se = 0 (note hle <
e
γb
in this case). By contrast, when education is
more effective (Figure 8 (b)(i) and (b)(ii)), Fl,t is constant for low or any Fl,t, thus F
∗
l and
the long-run proportion of educated workers increase with Fl,0. The dynamics of wages, the
wage inequality, and the signaling value are qualitatively same as regions of increasing Fh,t
of the previous case. In the long run, since F∗h = 1, wlu = hlu as under su = se = 0, while
educated wages decrease with F∗l . Hence, both lower wage inequality (and lower signaling
value) and higher educational level are realized with higher Fl,0 in (b)(i) and (b)(ii).
Finally, Proposition 1C presents the dynamics when E[hu,suH]>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e.
Proposition 1C (Dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t,part C) When E[hu,suH] >
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, Fh,t
increases over time and F∗h=1.
(a) When E[he,se]≤ eγb (<with se=0), Fl,t decreases over time and F
∗
l =0.
25Although intra-type wage differentials are constant, the ratio of type l to type h educated workers, which
is proportional to the slope of the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1), increases over time.
26(b)(i) of the proposition (Figure 8 (b)(i)) applies only when se > 0. In (a), ple = 0 for any Fl and Fh,
ple>0 always, or ple=1 at least for Fl≤Fh may hold; and in (b)(i), ple=1 at least for Fl≤Fh is possible.
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(a) E[he,se]≤ eγb (< when se=0) (b)(i) E[he,se]>
e
γb
>E[he,seH]
(b)(ii) E[he,seH]≥ eγb
Figure 8: Examples of the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t
when E[hu,1−su]≥(>with su=0) 1−γb(1+r)γb e≥E[hu,suH] (Proposition 1B)
(b) When E[he,se]>
e
γb
(≥with se=0)
(i) If E[he,seH]<
e
γb
, b∗(wle)=e and b
∗(wlu)=e intersect on the dividing line between ple=1
and ple ∈ (0,1) below the 45◦ line. Fl,t increases (decreases) above effective b∗(wlu) = e
(b∗(wle)=e), and is constant otherwise.
(ii) Otherwise, Fl,t increases (is constant) above (on or below) b
∗(wlu)=e and F
∗
l ∈ [Fl,0, 1].
The proposition, which applies only when su > 0 from Assumption 3 (ii), is illustrated
in Figure 9.27 As in the previous case, Fh increases over time and F
∗
h = 1. What is new
is that, when the productivity of education is not low, Fl,t increases over time at the left
side of effective b∗(wlu)= e (Figure 9 (b)(i) and (b)(ii)). Because of the positive effect of the
27Proposition 1C (b)(i) (Figure 9 (b)(i)) applies only when se> 0. In (a), ple=0 for any Fl and Fh may
hold; and in (b)(ii), ple=1 at least for Fl≤Fh is possible. In (b)(i) and (b)(ii), ple>0 always may hold.
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(a) E[he,se]≤ eγb (< when se=0) (b)(i) E[he,se]>
e
γb
>E[he,seH]
(b)(ii) E[he,seH]≥ eγb
Figure 9: Examples of the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t when E[hu,suH]>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e (Prop. 1C)
presence of the type h uneducated on wlu, children of some of the type l uneducated can
access education, which is not possible with su= se=0.
When the efficiency of education is not very high (Figure 9 (b)(i)), however, the growth of
Fl,t ceases at some point, and even a temporary decline of it is possible. Such scenario shows
interesting dynamics and thus is explained in detail. Suppose that Fh,0 is not high and thus
ple,t=0 is satisfied at first. With high 1−Fh,t, the average skill of uneducated workers is high
and thus education is not rewarding for type l. As Fh,t increases (thus a larger portion of the
type h take education) over time, uneducated wages fall, the signaling value of education
(seE˜[he]−suE˜[hu]) rises, and education becomes profitable at some point. Since wlu,t is still
relatively high, only some of the non-poor type l take education, i.e. ple,t∈(0,1), and the net
wages are equal, i.e. wle,t=wlu,t. While ple,t∈ (0,1) is satisfied, the ratio of type l to type h
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educated workers rises, and all wages and the overall wage inequality between educated and
uneducated workers fall over time.28 If the growth of Fl,t relative to Fh,t is high, after Fh,t
reaches a certain level, Fl,t starts to fall and ple,t increases. At some point, the net return to
education for type l becomes positive, i.e. ple=1, and thereafter, with Fh,t growing and Fl,t
falling, the ratio of type l to type h educated workers falls,29 educated (uneducated) wages
increase (decrease), and the wage inequality (and the signaling value of education) rises over
time. Eventually, wle,t recovers the level at which Fl,t does not fall, but with even lower
wlu,t, Fl,t never increases again. Hence, F
∗
h=1 and F
∗
l <1 in the long run.
The dynamics when hhe and/or hle are higher (Figure 9 (b)(ii)) is similar to the previous
case, but Fl,t never decreases, and when ple,t=1, it increases over the longer term. Further,
if Fl,t grows sufficiently faster than Fh,t, educated (uneducated) wages decrease (increase)
and the inequality and the signaling value fall when ple,t=1, and F
∗
h=F
∗
l =1 or close to it
is possible even from small Fh,0 and Fl,0. With more effective education, the growth of Fl,t
does not depress wle,t to the level that b
∗(wle,t)<e holds, while it has a positive effect on wlu,t
and promotes the upward mobility of the uneducated type l.
Finally, as for the relationship between the initial distribution of wealth and the long-
run outcome, in both (b)(i) and (b)(ii), the proportion of educated workers is higher and the
wage inequality (and the signaling value of education) is lower in the long run, as Fh,0 is
lower and Fl,0 is higher. This is because Fh,0 has a negative effect on the wage and wealth
accumulation of the uneducated type l.
4.1.1 Summary
The analysis has shown that the dynamics of Fh,t and Fl,t are interrelated, can be com-
plicated, and differ greatly depending on the initial distribution of wealth and exogenous
variables related to the productivity of education, ability determined outside education, and
the degree of information incompleteness. This contrasts with the complete information
case, in which the dynamics of the two variables are independent and simple. The inter-
action arises through the dependence of wages on average skills, which in turn depend on
Fj,t directly and indirectly: the proportion of type l individuals taking education, ple,tFl,t,
is affected not only by ’accessibility’, Fl,t, but also by ple,t, which depends on the signaling
28As noted in footnote 25, the ratio of type l to type h educated workers is proportional to the slope of the
dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1). The increasing ratio leads to the falling overall wage inequality.
29The ratio rises and then falls in (a) and (b)(i) of Figures 7 and 8 and in (a) and (b)(ii) of Figure 9 as well,
if the economy starts from the region ple<1 (and if Fh,t increases initially in Figure 7, and if the economy
transits to ple=1 in (b)(ii) of Figure 9).
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value and thus both Fh,t and Fl,t. Since wages of type l (type h) workers can exceed (fall
short of) their skill levels, unlike under se=su=0, F
∗
h=F
∗
l =1 (=0), or close to it, is possible
from Fh,0,Fl,0<1(>0) when both the ability and the productivity are high (low).
Related variables too exhibit interesting dynamics. Consider a realistic situation in which
the exogenous ability is not extremely low and thus Fh,t increases over time at least at low
Fh,t (Propositions 1A (II), 1B, and 1C) and the initial distribution of wealth is such that Fh,0
is not high. Then, the skill composition of educated workers changes over time as follows:
at first, education is not profitable to the type l and thus all educated workers are type h;
after Fh,t reaches a certain level, they become indifferent in the educational choice and the
ratio of type l to type h educated workers rises and the average skill of the educated falls
over time; after some point, all of the non-poor type l start to take education but, unless
Fl,t keeps growing, which is unlikely, the ratio starts to fall and the average skill begins to
rise eventually. As for wage-related variables, the signaling value of education increases,
uneducated wages decrease, and the wage inequality between educated and uneducated
workers rises over time when ple,t = 0; the signaling value is constant, all wages decrease,
and the wage inequality falls when ple,t ∈ (0,1); and when ple,t = 1, typically, the signaling
value increases, educated (uneducated) wages increase (decrease), and the inequality rises
again. The inequality and the signaling value fall when ple,t=1 only if Fl,t increases and the
relative growth of Fl,t to Fh,t is sufficiently high.
When skill accumulation outside education (hhu and/or hlu) is low (Proposition 1A), the
relationship between the initial distribution of wealth and the long-run outcome is intuitive:
in steady states, the wage inequality and thus the signaling value are lower, as Fh,0 is
lower and Fl,0 is higher, and the proportion of educated workers is higher, as Fh,0 (in some
cases) and Fl,0 are higher, unless Fh,t decreases initially. By contrast, when it is higher
(Propositions 1B and 1C), the relationship differs depending on skill accumulation outside
education and the productivity of education: in particular, when the productivity is low ((a)
of the propositions), the initial distribution has no effect, while when both of them are high
((b)(i) and (ii) of Proposition 1C), lower Fh,0 and higher Fl,0 lead to the higher proportion
of educated workers as well as lower inequality (and signaling value).
4.2 Steady-state welfare analyses
The preceding analysis suggests that the number of educated workers of each type, aggregate
output net of the education cost (thus aggregate consumption), and wage inequality generally
differ from the complete information case. This subsection investigates how they differ in
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steady states and how they are affected by the credit constraint.
First, the effect of the credit constraint on education in steady states is examined. Denote
the steady-state number of type j (j = h, l) educated workers in the original economy and
the one in the economy without the credit constraint by N∗je and N˜je, respectively.
Lemma 7 (Effect of the credit constraint on education in steady states)
(i) If E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e (≤ with su = 0), N
∗
he ≤ N˜he =H (< almost always). Otherwise,
N∗he=N˜he=H.
(ii) If E[he, se]≤(1+r)e+hlu (< with se=0), N∗le=N˜le=0. Otherwise, N∗le≤N˜le(< mostly).
With the credit constraint, fewer type h individuals take education except when hhu
and/or hlu is not low and thus the constraint does not prevent them from accessing education.
The constraint also lowers the number of type l educated workers unless the productivity of
education is so low that it is not profitable to them.
The next lemma examines the effect of positive se and/or su on steady-state education.
The steady-state number of type j (j = h, l) educated workers under se= su=0 is denoted
N∗je(s=0). When se, su=0 and hje=(1+r)e+hju, pje=1 is assumed to hold.
Lemma 8 (Effect of positive se and/or su on education in steady states)
(I)(a)When hhe< (1+r)e+hhu, if E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e (≤ with su=0), N
∗
he≥N∗he(s=0)=0
(> almost always); otherwise, N∗he=H>N
∗
he(s=0)=0.
(b)When hhe≥ (1+r)e+hhu, if hhu≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e, N
∗
he≤N∗he(s=0)=Fh,0H; if hhu> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>
E[hu,1−su], N∗he≤N∗he(s=0)=H (<mostly); otherwise, N∗he=N∗he(s=0)=H.
(II)(a)When hle< (1+r)e+hlu, if E[he,se]≤ eγb (<with se=0), N
∗
le=N
∗
le(s=0)=0; otherwise,
N∗le≥N∗le(s=0)=0 (>mostly).
(b)When hle≥(1+r)e+hlu:
(i)When E[he,se]≤ eγb (< if se=0), N
∗
le=N
∗
le(s=0)=0.
(ii)When E[he,se]>
e
γb
>hle, N
∗
le≥N∗le(s=0)=0 (>mostly).
(iii)When hle ≥ eγb , if E[hu,suH] ≤
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e, N∗le = N
∗
le(s = 0) = Fl,0(1−H); otherwise,
N∗le≥N∗le(s=0)=Fl,0(1−H).
When education is not socially productive for type h (Lemma 8 (I)(a)), positive se and/or
su result in overeducation almost always. They take education to mitigate the negative effect
of the presence of type l on their wage: education lowers the discrepancy between the wage
and their skill, i.e. se(hhe−E˜[he])<su(hhu−E˜[hu]). When it is productive for them (Lemma
8 (I)(b)), fewer of them can afford and take education due to the negative effect from the
uneducated type l, if hhu and/or hlu are low and thus F
∗
h<1 (cases of Proposition 1A).
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As for type l, when education is not productive for them (Lemma 8 (II)(a)), overeducation
occurs as long as some of them can afford education (cases (b) of Propositions 1A−1C),
because they can benefit from the positive effect from the educated type h. (The positive
effect from the uneducated type h is not large and thus ple=1 when F
∗
l > 0.) By contrast,
when education is productive (Lemma 8 (II)(b)), more of them take education with the
signaling effect, unless either F∗l = 0 (cases (a) of the propositions) or Fl,t is always time-
invariant (case (b)(ii) of Propositions 1A−1B). When both hhu and/or hlu and hle are high
(Lemma 8 (II)(b)(iii)), the positive effect from the type h uneducated stimulates wealth
accumulation of the type l uneducated and some of them become accessible to education
in the long run, while when the efficiency is intermediate (Lemma 8 (II)(b)(ii)), the same
mechanism works on educated individuals.30
Finally, based on these lemmas, the next proposition examines effects of positive se and/or
su and of the credit constraint on steady-state net aggregate output. In the proposition, Y
∗,
Y ∗(s = 0), Y˜ , and Y˜(s = 0) are net output of the original economy, of the economy with
se= su=0, of the economy without the credit constraint, and of the complete information
economy without the constraint, respectively. Clearly, Y˜(s=0) is highest and optimal.
Proposition 2 (Steady-state net aggregate output) 31
(i)When hhe<(1+r)e+hhu and hle<(1+r)e+hlu, Y˜ ≤Y ∗≤Y ∗(s=0)= Y˜(s=0) (Y ∗<Y ∗(s=0)
almost always and Y˜ <Y˜(s=0)).32
(ii)When hhe≥(1+r)e+hhu and hle<(1+r)e+hlu,
(a) If E[hu,1−su] < 1−γb(1+r)γb e (≤ with su = 0), Y
∗ ≤ Y ∗(s = 0) = (<)Y˜(s = 0) when hhu >
(≤)1−γb(1+r)
γb
e. If E[he, se] ≤ (1+ r)e+hlu (< when se = 0) as well, Y ∗ ≤ Y˜ (< almost
always)= Y˜(s=0); otherwise, the relative size is ambiguous.
(b)Otherwise, Y˜ ≤ Y ∗ and Y ∗(s=0)= Y˜(s=0).33 If E[he, se]≤ eγb (< with se=0) as well,
Y ∗=Y ∗(s=0); otherwise, Y ∗≤Y ∗(s=0)(< mostly).
(iii)When hhe ≥ (1+r)e+hhu and hle ≥ (1+r)e+hlu, Y ∗ ≤ (< mostly) Y˜ = Y˜(s = 0) and
Y ∗(s=0)<Y˜(s=0).
30As for effects of a change in the degree of information incompleteness, i.e. a change in (positive) se or
su, clear-cut results are not obtained because the effects on wealth accumulation of the two types and their
education depend on exogenous variables and the initial distribution of wealth in a complicated manner.
The exception is the effect of se on N∗le, which is mostly positive. Hence, higher se mitigates undereducation
(worsens overeducation) of the type l when education is productive (unproductive) for them. A detailed
analysis is available from the author upon request.
31The situation in which education is productive only for type l, i.e. hhe<(1+r)e+hhu and hle≥(1+r)e+hlu,
is possible but empirically unlikely, thus the result is not presented.
32 If E[hu, 1−su]≥ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (> with su=0) and E[he, se]≤(1+r)e+hlu (< with se=0), Y˜ =Y
∗; otherwise,
Y˜ ≤Y ∗ (< mostly).
33If E[he, se]≤(1+r)e+hlu (< when se=0), Y˜ =Y ∗.
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(a) If E[hu,1−su]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e (≤ with su = 0), Y
∗ ≤ Y ∗(s= 0) when E[he, se]≤ eγb (< with
se=0) or hle≥ eγb ; in other cases, the relative size is ambiguous.
(b)Otherwise, Y ∗≥ Y ∗(s= 0) when E[he, se]> eγb > hle or when E[hu, suH]>
1−γb(1+r)
γb
e and
hle≥ eγb ; Y
∗=Y ∗(s=0) in other cases.
From the proposition and the lemmas, effects on net output and several dimensions of
inequalities are summarized as follows. When education is not productive for anybody, the
signaling effect leads to overeducation, intra-type inequality, and lower net output. Lifting
the credit constraint exacerbates overeducation and lowers net output further in most cases,
although intra-type equality is attained.34
When education is productive only for type h, net output is lower with the incomplete
information in most cases, because fewer type h individuals take education and/or some of
the type l take unproductive education. Inequality among the type l is clearly higher under
incomplete information, whereas inter-type inequality and the inequality between educated
and uneducated workers are lower, because type h (type l) wages are lower (higher) and a
lower (higher) proportion of the type h (type l) take education. (These results on inter-type
and inter-education inequalities hold when education is productive for both types as well.)
The effect of the credit constraint on net output now depends on whether the constraint
affects education of the type h or not: if it does not prevent them from accessing education
in the long run (Proposition 2 (ii)(b)), lifting the constraint just exacerbates overeducation
of the type l and lowers net output; otherwise, the effect could be ambiguous.
Finally, when education is productive for both types, net output can be higher with the
signaling effect. This is the case if skill accumulation outside education is high enough that
all of the type h and the higher proportion of the type l can access education in the long run
because of either higher upward mobility of the uneducated (when the efficiency of education
is high) or lower downward mobility of the educated (when the efficiency is intermediate).
Lifting the credit constraint leads to optimal universal education and maximizes net output.
4.3 Policy Implications
Several policy implications can be derived from the analyses. First, policies that enable
everyone to access education (e.g. free public education) and those that increase access
directly (e.g. wealth redistribution and tuition subsidies) or indirectly through promoting
34The effect on inter-type inequality is ambiguous, because while the return to education falls as the ratio
of type l to type h educated workers increases, inter-type inequality among educated workers is higher than
among uneducated workers from Assumption 2.
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skill accumulation outside education and thereby raising earnings of the poor (e.g. child
nutrition programs, childcare programs, and job training programs for the poor) may not be
desirable in the presence of the signaling effect. Unless education is socially productive for
everyone, such policies could lead to overeducation of unproductive individuals and lower
net output. By contrast, under complete information, such policies always (weakly) raise net
output, since social and individual returns to education coincide. Hence, when the signaling
effect is not negligible, it is important to ensure that education is socially productive for
everyone (e.g. by raising the effectiveness of education especially for the disadvantaged) or
to restrict access only to high ability students (e.g. by implementing competitive entrance
exams), although the latter kind of policies would raise equity concerns. The harm from
policies increasing the access and the need for these complementary measures are greater at
later stages of development, since the signaling value of education and thus the return to
education of low ability individuals increase over time.
Second, wealth redistribution that raises the accessibility (raises both Fh,t and Fl,t since
the government usually cannot distinguish different types) may not be desirable for a dif-
ferent reason from above: it could have a negative effect on earnings and education of the
low-ability poor. This happens if the policy stimulates education of the type h poor too
much, and as a result, lowers the average skill of the uneducated and thus their wages, and
hampers wealth accumulation of the type l poor (see Figure 9 (b)(i) and (ii)). Such policy
is certainly undesirable when education is socially productive. Without the signaling effect,
by contrast, the dynamics of different types are unrelated, thus the policy is always (weakly)
desirable. The interrelated dynamics also imply that policies that focus too much on raising
skills of a particular type are not very effective in the long term.
Finally, positive se and/or su may reflect effects of unions or fairness concern in the
workplace on wage setting (see footnote 7), so the above implications apply when these
effects, not the signaling effect, are important as well.
5 Conclusion
Many empirical works suggest that education not only raises human capital but also acts as
a signal when employers have incomplete information on employees’ skills. This paper has
examined how the number of educated individuals, the importance of the signaling value of
education, and the wage inequality between educated and uneducated workers change over
time in an economy where education has the dual roles and some fraction of individuals is
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credit constrained from taking education, and has compared the dynamics with those under
complete information. It also examines whether the signaling role leads to higher aggregate
consumption or not in the long run.
In the present paper, weights se and su of wage equations, i.e. the degree of information
incompleteness, are assumed to be exogenous and held constant. However, it would be more
realistic to consider them as endogenous because, in actual economy, the degree of informa-
tion incompleteness would be different depending on types of jobs and the composition of
jobs changes over the course of development. The important extension of endogenizing the
weights is left for future work.
Appendix Lemmas A1−A3
Lemma A1 (Relation of b∗(whe)=e with the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1))
Suppose that the dividing line and b∗(whe)= e exist, i.e. conditions of Lemma 3 (III) and of
Lemma 6 (iii) hold.
(A)When E[he,1−se(1−H)]> eγb
(i) If E[hu,su]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e, b
∗(whe)=e is on or below the dividing line.
(ii) If E[hu,su]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle), b
∗(whe)=e intersects
with the line at Fl∈(0,1). Only a segment of b∗(whe)=e on or below the line is effective.
(iii) Otherwise, b∗(whe)=e is above the line and thus b
∗(whe)>e always.
(B)When E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb
(i) If E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (<with su=0), b
∗(whe)=e is below the line.
(ii) If E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>hlu+(1−se)(hhe−hle), b
∗(whe)=e intersects with
the line at Fh∈(0, 1) and only a segment of b∗(whe)=e on or below the line is effective.
(iii) Otherwise, b∗(whe)≥e always (b∗(whe)=e is on or above the line).
(C)When E[he,1−se(1−H)]= eγb , b
∗(whe)=e is the 45
◦ line.
(i) If E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)= 1−γb(1+r)γb e, the dividing line and b
∗(whe)=e coincide.
(ii)When E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)<(>)1−γb(1+r)γb e, the line is above (below) b
∗(whe)=e.
Figure A1 illustrates the relation when E[he,1−se(1−H)] 6= eγb , based on Lemma A1 (A)
and (B).35 Figure A1 (A)(ii) shows an example of the relation when the conditions of Lemma
A1 (A)(ii) hold. The broken line is the dividing line and ple ∈ (0,1) (ple = 1) in the region
above (below) the line, while b∗(whe)=e holds on the solid line and b
∗(whe)<(>)e at the left
35When se=0, b∗(whe)= e does not exist and the lemma does not apply. When su=0, cases (A)(ii) and
(B)(ii) of the lemma (Figure A1 (A)(ii) and (B)(ii)) do not occur.
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(A)(i) E[he,1−se(1−H)]> eγb
and E[hu,su]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(A)(ii) E[he,1−se(1−H)]> eγb and
E[hu,su]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)
(A)(iii) E[he,1−se(1−H)]> eγb and
E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≥ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (> with su=0)
(B)(i) E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb and
E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≤ 1−γb(1+r)γb e (< with su=0)
(B)(ii) E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb and
E[hu,suH]+(1−se)(hhe−hle)> 1−γb(1+r)γb e>hlu+(1−se)(hhe−hle)
(B)(iii) E[he,1−se(1−H)]< eγb and
hlu+(1−se)(hhe−hle)≥ 1−γb(1+r)γb e
Figure A1: Examples of the relation of b∗(whe)=e with the dividing line between ple=1 and
ple∈(0,1) when E[he,1−se(1−H)] 6= eγb (Lemma A1 (A) and (B))
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(right) side of the line. Note that the solid line is vertical at the intersection of the two loci,
because b∗(whe)=e when ple=1 is not effective above the dividing line and the proportion of
type l individuals with education, pleFl, is same on the vertical line. Unlike the figure, the
dividing line may approach (Fh,Fl)=(1,1) but the relation is qualitatively same.
In Figure A1 (B)(ii), the dividing line intersects with Fl=0 at Fh∈(0,1) and thus ple=0
at small Fh. Unlike Figure A1 (A)(ii), b
∗(whe) = e is not effective when Fh is small, and
b∗(whe)<e when Fh and Fl are high. In Figure A1 (A)(iii) and (B)(iii), b
∗(whe)= e is always
above the dividing line and is not effective, thus b∗(whe)>e holds for any Fh and Fl. Finally,
in Figure A1 (A)(i) and (B)(i), b∗(whe)=e is always below the dividing line.
Similarly, the next lemma examines the relation of b∗(whu)=e with the dividing line.
Lemma A2 (Relation of b∗(whu)=e with the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1))
Suppose that the dividing line and b∗(whu)=e when ple=1 exist (conditions of Lemma 3 (III)
and of Lemma 6 (i) hold).
(A)When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(i) If E[he,se]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≤ eγb , b
∗(whu)=e when ple=1 is above the dividing line and
b∗(whu)<e always when ple=1, while b
∗(whu)=e when ple=0 is effective.
(ii) If E[he,se]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)> eγb >E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu), b
∗(whu)=e (when ple=1)
intersects with the line at Fl∈(0,1) and a segment of it on or below the line is effective.
(iii) If E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≥ eγb (>with se=0), b
∗(whu)=e is below the line.
(B)When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e
(i) If E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≤ eγb (<with se=0), b
∗(whu)<e always (b
∗(whu)=e is above
the line).
(ii) If E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)> eγb >hle+(1−su)(hhu−hlu), b
∗(whu)=e intersects with the
line at Fh∈(0, 1) and only a segment of b∗(whu)=e on or below it is effective.
(iii) Otherwise, b∗(whu)=e is on or below the line.
(C)When E[hu,1−su(1−H)]= 1−γb(1+r)γb e, b
∗(whu)=e is the 45
◦ line.
(i) If E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)= eγb , b
∗(whu)=e and the dividing line coincide.
(ii)When E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)<(>) eγb , the line is below (above) b
∗(whu)=e.
Figure A2 illustrates the relation when E[hu, 1−su(1−H)] 6= 1−γb(1+r)γb e, based on Lemma A2
(A) and (B).36 Figure A2 (A)(i) corresponds to the case in which the conditions of Lemma
A2 (A)(i) hold. Since the dividing line intersects with Fl=0 at Fh∈(0,1), ple=0 at small Fh.
36When su=0, b∗(whu)= e does not exist and the lemma does not apply. When se=0, cases (A)(ii) and
(B)(ii) of the lemma (Figure A2 (A)(ii) and (B)(ii)) do not occur.
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(A)(i) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e
and E[he,se]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≤ eγb
(A)(ii) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e
and E[he,se]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)> eγb>E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)
(A)(iii) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]> 1−γb(1+r)γb e
and E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≥ eγb (>with se=0)
(B)(i) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e
and E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≤ eγb (<with se=0)
(B)(ii) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e and
E[he,seH]+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)> eγb>hle+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)
(B)(iii) E[hu,1−su(1−H)]< 1−γb(1+r)γb e
and hle+(1−su)(hhu−hlu)≥ eγb
Figure A2: Examples of the relation of b∗(whu)=e with the dividing line between ple=1 and
ple∈(0,1)/between ple=0 and ple>0, when E[hu,1−su(1−H)] 6= 1−γb(1+r)γb e (Lemma A2 (A)(B))
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When ple>0, b
∗(whu)=e is always above the line and is not effective, while b
∗(whu)=e when
ple=0 (the solid vertical line) is effective (effective only in this case). Thus, b
∗(whu)> (<)e
at the left (right) side of the line.
In Figure A2 (A)(ii), b∗(whu)=e (when ple=1) intersects with the dividing line and thus
a portion of it is not effective. b∗(whu)>e holds above effective b
∗(whu)= e, while b
∗(whu)<e
holds below it and in the region with Fh greater than the value at the intersection. The
two loci intersect in Figure A2 (B)(ii) too, but the relationship between them is opposite to
Figure A2 (A)(ii). Thus, b∗(whu)<e when Fh is smaller than the value at the intersection.
In Figure A2 (B)(i), b∗(whu)= e is always above the dividing line and b
∗(whu)<e for any Fh
and Fl, and in Figure A2 (A)(iii) and (B)(iii), b
∗(whu)=e is always below the line.
As for b∗(wlk)=e (k=e, u), the following result is enough to examine the dynamics.
Lemma A3 (Relation of b∗(wlk)=e with the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1))
(i) If b∗(wlu)=e or b
∗(wle)=e intersects with the dividing line between ple=1 and ple∈(0,1),
they intersect on the dividing line.
(ii) If b∗(wle)>e (b
∗(wlu)<e) holds on the dividing line, b
∗(wlu)=e (b
∗(wle)=e), when it exists,
is located below the line on the (Fh,Fl) plane.
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